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The doubling of grain production and tripling of livestock production since the
early 1960s has resulted in a global food supply sufficient to provide adequate
energy and protein for all. However, about 820 million people lack access to
sufficient food to lead healthy and productive lives, and around 185 million
children are seriously underweight for their age. At the close of the 20th
century, astonishing advances in agricultural productivity and human ingenuity
have not yet translated into a world free of hunger and malnutrition.
What are the prospects for global food security in the 21st century? Will
there be enough food to meet the needs of current and future generations? Can,
and will, global food security be attained or will food surpluses continue to co-
exist with widespread hunger and malnutrition?
OUTLOOK FOR GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY
Projections of food production and consumption to the year 2020 offer some
signs of progress. But prospects of a food-secure world — a world in which
each and every person is assured continual access to the food required to lead a
healthy and productive life — remain bleak if the global community continues
with business as usual.
Worldwide, per capita availability of food is projected to increase around
seven percent between 1993 and 2020, from about 2,700 calories per person
per day in 1993 to about 2,900 calories. Increases in average per capita food
availability are expected in all major regions. China and East Asia are projected
to experience the largest increase, and West Asia and North Africa the smallest
(Figure 1). The projected average availability of about 2,300 calories per person
per day in Sub-Saharan Africa is just barely above the minimum required for a
healthy and productive life. Since available food is not equally distributed to all,
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a large proportion of the region’s population is likely to have access to less food
than needed.
Demand for food is influenced by a number of forces, including population
growth and movements, income levels and economic growth, human resource
development, and lifestyles and preferences. Almost 80 million people are likely
to be added to the world’s population each year during the next quarter century,
increasing world population by 35 percent from 5.69 billion in 1995 to 7.67
billion by 2020 (UN 1996). More than 95 percent of the population increase is
expected in developing countries, whose share of global population is projected
to increase by 79 percent in 1995 to 84 percent in 2020. Over this period, the
absolute population increase will be highest in Asia, but the relative increase
will be greatest in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the population is expected to
almost double by 2020 (Figure 2).
At the same time, urbanization will contribute to changes in the types of food
demanded. Much of the population increase in developing countries is expected
in the cities; the developing world’s urban population is projected to double
over the next quarter century to 3.6 billion (UN 1995). Urbanization pro-
foundly affects dietary and food demand patterns: The increasing opportunity
cost of women’s time, changes in food preferences caused by changing lifestyles,
and changes in relative prices associated with rural-urban migration lead to
more diversified diets with shifts from basic staples such as sorghum, millet,
and maize to other cereals such as rice and wheat that require less preparation
and to milk and livestock products, fruits and vegetables, and processed foods.
People’s access to food depends on income. Currently, more than 1.3 billion
people are absolutely poor, with incomes of a dollar a day or less per person,
while another two billion people are only marginally better off (World Bank
1997a). Income growth rates have varied considerably between regions in
recent years, with Sub-Saharan Africa and West Asia and North Africa
struggling with negative growth rates, while East Asia was experiencing annual
growth rates exceeding seven percent (World Bank 1997b). Prospects for
economic growth during the next quarter century appear favorable, with global
income growth projected to average 2.7 percent per year between 1993 and
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2020 (Figure 3). The projected income growth rates for developing countries
as a group is almost double those for developed countries. Growth rates are
projected to be lowest in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Even
Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to experience positive per capita income growth
between 1993 and 2020, although it will be quite low. However, unless
significant and fundamental changes occur in many developing countries,
disparities in income levels and growth rates both between and within countries
are likely to persist, and poverty is likely to remain entrenched in South Asia
and Latin America and to increase considerably in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Under the baseline scenario, IFPRI IMPACT projects global demand for
cereals to increase by 41 percent between 1993 and 2020 to reach 2,490 million
metric tons, for meat demand to increase by 63 percent to 306 million tons, and
for roots and tubers demand to increase by 40 percent to 855 million tons
(Figure 4).
Developing countries will drive increases in world food demand. With an
expected 40 percent population increase and an average annual income growth
rate of 4.3 percent, developing countries are projected to account for most of
the increase in global demand for cereals and meat products between 1993 and
2020 (Figure 5).
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Demand for cereals for feeding livestock will increase considerably in
importance in coming decades, especially in developing countries, in response
to strong demand for livestock products. Between 1993 and 2020, developing
countries’ demand for cereals for animal feed is projected to double while
demand for cereals for food for direct human consumption is projected to
increase by 47 percent (Figure 6). By 2020, 24 percent of the cereal demand
in developing countries will be for feed, compared with 19 percent in 1993.
However, in absolute terms, the increase in cereal demand for food will be
higher than for feed. In developed countries, the increase in cereal demand for
feed will outstrip the increase in cereal demand for food in both absolute and
relative terms.
How will the expected increases in cereal demand be met? Primarily by
productivity increases; increases in cultivated area will contribute less than
20 percent of the increase in global cereal production between 1993 and 2020
(Figure 7). Most of the growth in cereal area will be concentrated in the relatively
low productivity cereals in Sub-Saharan Africa. There will be some expansion in
Latin America, but cereal area will remain virtually stagnant in Asia.
Since growth in cultivated areas is unlikely to contribute much to future
production growth, the burden of meeting increased demand for cereal rests
on improvements in crop yields. However, the annual increase in yields of the
major cereals is projected to slow down during 1993–2020 in both developed
and developing countries (Figure 8). This is worrisome given that yield growth
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rates were already on the decline. The two key reasons for slow cereal yield
growth rates are as follows:
(1) In regions where input use is high, such as Asia, farmers are approaching
economically optimum yield levels, making it more difficult to sustain the
same rates of yield gains; and
(2) declining world cereal prices are causing farmers to switch from cereals to
other, more profitable crops and are causing governments to slow their
investment in agricultural research and irrigation and other infrastructure.
With the projected slowdowns in area expansion and yield growth, cereal
production in developing countries as a group is also forecast to slow to an
annual rate of 1.5 percent during 1993–2020, compared with 2.3 percent during
1982–94. This figure is still higher, however, than the one percent annual rate
of growth projected for developed countries during 1993–2020.
Food production will not keep pace with demand in developing countries,
and an increasing portion of the developing world’s food consumption will have
to be met by imports from the developed world. The proportion of cereal
demand that is met through net imports is projected to rise from nine percent
in 1993 to 14 percent in 2020 (Figure 9). As a group, developing countries are
projected to more than double their net imports of cereals (the difference
between demand and production) between 1993 and 2020 (Figure 10). With
the exception of Latin America, all major developing regions are projected to
increase their net cereal imports. The quadrupling of Asia’s net imports will be
driven primarily by rapid income growth, while the 150 percent increase
forecast for Sub-Saharan Africa will be driven primarily by its continued poor
performance in food production. The United States is forecast to provide almost
60 percent of the cereal net imports of developing countries in 2020, the
European Union about 16 percent, and Australia about 10 percent. The IFPRI
projections indicate that long-term trends in real food prices will be falling
slightly (Figure 11).
With continued population growth, rapid income growth, and changes in
lifestyles, demand for meat is projected to increase by 2.8 percent per year
during 1993–2020 in developing countries and by 0.5 percent per year in
developed countries. While per capita demand for cereals is projected to
increase by only eight percent, demand for meat will increase by 43 percent.
The increase in per capita meat demand will be largest in China and smallest
in South Asia; by 2020, Chinese per capita consumption of meat will be eight
times that of South Asia (Figure 12). Meat production is expected to grow by
2.7 percent per year in developing countries during 1993–2020 (compared
with 5.9 percent during 1982–94) and by 0.8 percent in developed countries
(compared with 0.9 percent during 1982–94). Despite high rates of production
growth, developing countries as a group are projected to increase their net meat
imports 20-fold, reaching 11.5 million tons in 2020 (Figure 13). Latin America
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will continue to be a net exporter of meat, but Asia will switch from being a
small net exporter to a large net importer.
Net imports are a reflection of the gap between production and market
demand. For many of the poor, the gap between food production and nutri-
tional needs is likely to be even wider than that between production and
demand, because many of these people are priced out of the market, even at
low food prices, and are unable to exercise their demand for needed food. The
higher-income developing countries, notably those of East Asia, will be able to
fill the gap between production and demand through commercial imports, but
the poorer countries may be forced to allocate foreign exchange to other uses
and thus might not be able to import food in needed quantities. It is the latter
group of countries, including most of those in Sub-Saharan Africa and some in
Asia, that will remain a challenge and require special assistance to avert wide-
spread hunger and malnutrition.
EMERGING ISSUES IN GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY
Volatile Cereal Prices
Concerns are growing that cereal prices may be more volatile than in the past
(FAO 1996b). Reduced stocks and uncertainties associated with developments
in China and the former Soviet Union, and increasing weather fluctuations
among other factors, could increase price instability. On the other hand, market
liberalization in developing countries, policy reform in developed countries,
and more consistent and transparent stock-holding and trade policies will make
producers more responsive to price changes and could reduce price instability.
How these factors play out will determine whether cereal prices will be more
volatile in coming years. In addition to price fluctuations in the international
market, many low-income food-insecure developing countries suffer from large
domestic price fluctuations owing to inadequate markets, poor roads and other
infrastructure, and inappropriate policies and institutions. Even small changes
in production resulting from better or poorer growing conditions may cause
large fluctuations in food prices.
Feeding China
With one-fifth of the world’s population and one of the fastest-growing and
most rapidly transforming economies in the world, China has the potential to
significantly affect global food markets depending on the extent of its future
demand for cereals, its capacity to meet these demands through production,
and the degree to which it enters world markets to satisfy its unmet needs
(Rozelle and Rosegrant 1997). Views on the size and dominance of China’s food
economy in the 21st century vary widely, with some forecasting that China will
be a major cereal exporter (Chen and Buckwell 1991; Mei 1995) and others
cautioning that China might become a major cereal importer, if not the world’s
largest importer (Garnaut and Ma 1992; Carter and Funing 1991; Brown 1995).
IMPACT projections indicate that, in the baseline scenario, total cereal demand
in China will increase by 42 percent, to 490 million tons, between 1993 and
2020, and cereal production by 31 percent, to 449 million tons. At 41 million
tons, China’s net cereal imports in 2020 would represent 18 percent of the
developing world’s projected net cereal imports. While sizable, China’s
projected imports are unlikely to pose an intolerable burden on the global
food situation. For meat, China’s production is projected to almost keep
up with increases in demand. A predicted increase in demand of 132 percent
between 1993 and 2020 would result in net imports of only 0.3 million
tons — three percent of the developing world’s projected net imports in 2020.
Alternative simulations suggest that only with extraordinarily rapid income
growth, severe resource degradation, and failure to invest in agriculture would
China’s net cereal imports increase substantially and have a significant effect on
world cereal prices (Rozelle and Rosegrant 1997). China is already a significant
player in world food markets and is likely to become increasingly important.
However, it does not represent a major threat to world food markets.
Feeding India
With a population of 930 million in 1995, India is the second most populous
country in the world after China (UN 1996). Furthermore, population growth
in India continues to be high and India’s population is likely to exceed China’s
by 2020. Like China more than a decade ago, India is in the midst of major
economic reform. If it succeeds, incomes in India will rise much faster than
they have in recent decades, with profound effects on food demand and food
security. In the IMPACT baseline scenario, India is projected to have an average
annual economic growth rate of 5.5 percent during 1993–2020.
As incomes increase, will Indians greatly increase their consumption of
livestock products, or will they remain more or less vegetarian, as India’s
history and cultural traditions would suggest? Views are mixed. In the baseline
scenario, demand for livestock products is projected to increase by 4.6 million
tons between 1993 and 2020 to 8.5 million tons (the corresponding increase
in meat demand in China is 51 million tons to 89 million tons in 2020). Given
the extremely low initial levels of livestock consumption in India, rapid growth
in absolute demand for livestock would require a dramatic change in eating
patterns. In a scenario modeling the effects of such a change in Indian diets,
India’s demand for meat products is forecast to increase almost 10-fold from
3.8 million tons in 1993 to 36.4 million tons in 2020. This increase in demand
would have to be met through trade, as meat production is not projected to
increase beyond the 8.5 million tons shown in the baseline scenario for 2020.
India’s projected net meat imports of 28 million tons under this scenario are a
far cry from the less than 0.5 million tons forecast in the baseline scenario. This
increase in Indian net imports would increase world meat prices by 21 percent
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in 2020 relative to the baseline scenario and by 13 percent relative to 1993. If
India attempts to meet potentially large increases in livestock demand through
domestic livestock production rather than imports, thereby raising demand for
feed grain, implications for global livestock and cereal trade and prices would
be dramatically different from those predicted by the scenario that relies
primarily on livestock imports to meet demand.
THE TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET
UNION
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the associated political changes in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union brought great promise for rapid economic
growth in that part of the world. Many projected that food production in a
number of countries affected, including Ukraine and the Russian Federation,
would expand rapidly and significantly, causing Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union to switch quickly from being net importers of grain to being
significant net exporters (Tyers 1994). Although net grain imports by the
former Soviet Union have fallen dramatically, this optimistic scenario has not
materialized (FAO various years). There is still a great deal of uncertainty
regarding future food production and demand in those countries.
IMPACT’s baseline scenario projects that Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union will become major net exporters of cereal by 2020, on the order
of about 33 million tons. Cereal production is projected to increase by almost
40 percent between 1993 and 2020 to 341 million tons, while demand is
projected to increase by 12 percent to 308 million tons. However, if incomes
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union grow faster than the baseline
projection and crop productivity increases at a slower pace than forecast, these
regions would remain net importers. For example, with an increase in income
growth of 30 percent and a drop in production growth of two-thirds, crop
production would increase by only 12 percent between 1993 and 2020 to 278
million tons while demand would increase to 304 million tons, resulting in net
cereal imports of 26 million tons in 2020 — a very different outcome. Slow
increases in crop production in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
could cause world cereal prices to be higher in 2020 relative to the baseline
scenario. Changes in cereal production and demand in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union can have significant effects on the world food situation,
but it would take very large declines in productivity growth in this region to
dramatically drive up cereal prices.
FRAGILE RECOVERY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the population growth rate has exceeded the rate of
growth in food production since the early 1970s and the gap is widening,
resulting in declining per capita food production (Figure 14). Simple
extrapolations of the trends in population and food production growth since
1961 show a further increase in the gap between population and food
production. This is exactly the gap predicted by Malthus.1  However, several
recent developments suggest that Malthus’ shadow over Sub-Saharan Africa
could finally be waning.
First, Malthus’ predictions grossly underestimated the potential of pro-
ductivity-increasing technology. Where such technology has been effectively
developed and utilized, such as in Asia, food production has expanded much
faster than population. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the potential of appropriate
productivity-increasing technology has yet to be realized. Maize yields for
Africa and Asia were virtually the same in 1961, but since then they have
tripled in Asia and quintupled in China while they have remained stagnant at
around one ton per hectare in Africa (FAO 1997a; Byerlee and Eicher 1997).
However, there are encouraging signs that productivity-increasing technology
is beginning to accelerate yield growth of African food crops (CGIAR 1997).
Second, after a number of years of low or negative growth, Sub-Saharan
Africa is experiencing economic recovery. However, this economic recovery is
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fragile. Some of the factors that contributed to the recovery are short term in
nature and cannot be expected to persist; these include higher commodity
prices and favorable weather conditions. Other factors, such as policy reforms,
an improved macroeconomic environment, and social and political stability, can
have a more lasting effect on economic growth, if properly nurtured. Moreover,
economic growth rates will have to be substantially higher if they are to make a
dent in Sub-Saharan Africa’s poverty. Per capita incomes have fallen so much
that even if economic growth were to continue at the current pace (about five
percent per year), it would still take at least a decade to recover to the levels
prevailing in 1980 (CGIAR 1997).
If Malthus is to be proven wrong in Sub-Saharan Africa, a much greater effort
must be made to ensure that farmers have access to appropriate production
technology and that policies are conducive to expanded productivity in staple
food crops. Besides new initiatives and expanded support for agricultural
development, more must also be done to reduce population growth. Sub-
Saharan Africa’s annual population growth is projected to decline between 1993
and 2020. Yet the number of people added to the region’s population every year
is projected to increase until at least 2020, a consequence of the past high rates
of population increases. Moreover, Sub-Sahara’s projected annual population
growth rate of 2.33 percent during 2015–2020 will be more than double the
growth rates in other regions (UN 1996). Population growths of this magnitude
will severely constrain efforts to increase income and improve welfare, while at
the same time it will greatly increase the need for food.
WEATHER FLUCTUATIONS AND CLIMATE CHANGE
With the recent resurgence of El Niño, followed by the relatively weaker La
Niña, major weather fluctuations are under way or imminent in many parts of
the world. These weather fluctuations could lead to sizable food production
shortfalls and deterioration in food security in many parts of the world. The
1982–83 El Niño caused severe flooding in Latin America, droughts in parts of
Asia, declines in fish stocks, and other weather-related damage estimated at
over $10 billion (FAO 1997a, 1997b). The 1991–92 El Niño resulted in severe
drought in Southern Africa that caused cereal production to drop by 60 percent
or more in several countries, and imports and food aid had to increase to meet
more than half of the cereal consumption in at least five countries (Pinstrup-
Andersen, Pandya-Lorch, and Babu 1997). The 1997–98 El Niño far surpassed
the last two major El Niños in severity, causing severe drought in Southeast
Asia, flooding in the Andean countries of South America, and drought in a wide
swath across Eastern Africa, and in general diminishing agricultural production
around the globe. El Niño adds a major element of uncertainty to agricultural
production and livelihoods around the world. And concerns are growing that
El Niños may become more frequent and more severe in the fuure as a result of
climate changes.
Although the trend of global warming is becoming increasingly clear, its
effects on food production are still uncertain. Some research suggests that
growing conditions will deteriorate in current tropical areas (where many of
the developing countries are located) and improve in current temperate areas
(where many of the developed countries are located) (Rosenzweig and Parry
1994; Fischer et al. 1996). However, effects on productivity and production
will occur over a long period of time and will be very small in any given year.
Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that policies and technologies can be
developed to effectively prevent or counter the negative productivity effects of
global warming. Failure by the public sector to act, and failure by the market
and the private sector to respond, could result in significant long-term effects
on food supply. Such a scenario might include reduced food production in
tropical and subtropical countries and increased production in temperate
countries. Whether these opposing effects will cancel each other out through
expanded international trade, with little or no effect on total world food supply,
is yet to be determined.
GROWING WATER SCARCITY
Unless properly managed, fresh water may well emerge as the key constraint to
global food production. While supplies of water are adequate in the aggregate
to meet demand for the foreseeable future, water is poorly distributed across
countries, within countries, and between seasons. And, with a fixed amount
of renewable water resources to meet the needs of a continually increasing
population, per capita water availability is declining steadily. Today, 28
countries with a total population exceeding 300 million people face water
stress;2  by 2025, their number could increase to about 50 countries with a total
population of about three billion people (Rosegrant, Ringler, and Gerpacio
1997; Population Action International 1995).
Demand for water will continue to grow rapidly. Since 1970, global demand
for water has grown by 2.4 percent per year (Rosegrant, Ringler, and Gerpacio
1997). Projections of water demand3  to 2020 indicate that global water with-
drawals will increase by 35 percent between 1995 and 2020 to reach 5,060
billion cubic meters. Developed countries are projected to increase their water
withdrawals by 22 percent, more than 80 percent of the increase being for
industrial uses. Developing countries are projected to increase their withdraw-
als by 43 percent over the same period and to experience a significant structural
change in their demand for water, reducing the share for agricultural uses.
The costs of developing new sources of water are high and rising, and
nontraditional sources such as desalination, reuse of wastewater, and water
harvesting are unlikely to add much to global water availability, although they
may be important in some local or regional ecosystems. So how can the rapid
increases in water demand be met? The rapidly growing domestic and industrial
demand for water will have to be met from reduced use in the agriculture
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sector, which is by far the largest water user, accounting for 72 percent of global
water withdrawals and 87 percent of withdrawals in developing countries in
1995 (Rosegrant, Ringler, and Gerpacio 1997). Reforming policies that have
contributed to the wasteful use of water offers considerable opportunity to
save water, improve efficiency of water use, and boost crop output per unit of
water. Required policy reforms include establishing secure water rights for
users; decentralizing and privatizing water management functions; and setting
incentives for water conservation, including markets in tradable water rights,
pricing reform and reduction in subsidies, and effluent or pollution charges
(Rosegrant 1997). Failure to address the gap between tightening supplies
and increasing demand for water could significantly slow growth in food
production.
ESCALATING CONCERNS ABOUT FOOD SAFETY
Concerns about food safety are not new. Since time immemorial, human beings
have worried about whether they have sufficient food to eat and whether the
food they consume is safe and healthy. However, food safety concerns are
escalating, particularly in industrialized countries, as evident by the growing
demand for organic foods; by the strengthening public backlash against
genetically modified organisms; by the extraordinarily high level of interest
by consumers in the precise origin and modes of producing and processing
the food they consume; and by the proliferation of regulations of producing,
processing, storing, and transporting foods. There have been a series of well-
publicized outbreaks of food-borne illnesses and massive food recalls in recent
years, particularly in the United States. In developing countries, however,
where food- and water-borne health risks are a major cause of illness and death,
particularly among infants and children, food safety concerns do not seem to
have garnered increased attention.
Yet, developing countries could be significantly affected by the increased
concerns in industrialized countries in at least two major ways: first, because
exports of their food commodities could be exposed to new and more
demanding food safety standards partly through changes in the Codex
Alimentarius and partly through unilateral demands by importers (thus, food
safety requirements may become a hindrance to developing countries for
realizing benefits from exports, either because unreasonable standards cannot
be met or because food safety would be used as a nontariff barrier by importing
countries); and second, because changing attitudes toward and legislation for
food safety in industrialized countries could spill over into developing
countries without due attention to local conditions and constraints and
influence, among other things, availability of and access to food (for example,
legislation to curtail or prohibit the use of fertilizers or chemical plant
protection methods could have a negative effect on food security by increased
unit costs of productions).
THE ROLE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY
Modern science offers humankind a powerful instrument to assure food
security for all. Through enhanced knowledge and better technologies for food
and agriculture, science has contributed to astonishing advances in feeding the
world in recent decades. If we are to produce enough food to meet increasing
and changing food needs, to make more efficient use of land already under
cultivation, to better manage our natural resources, and to improve the capacity
of hungry people to grow or purchase needed food, we must put all the tools of
modern science to work.
Modern agricultural biotechnology is one of the most promising develop-
ments in modern science. Used in collaboration with traditional or conventional
breeding methods, it can raise crop productivity, increase resistance to pests
and diseases, develop tolerance to adverse weather conditions, improve the
nutritional value of some foods, and enhance the durability of products during
harvesting or shipping. With reasonable biosafety regulations, this can be done
with little or no risk to human health and the environment. Yet little modern
agricultural biotechnology research is taking place in or for developing
countries. Most such research is occurring in private firms in industrialized
countries, focuses on the plants and animals produced in temperate climates,
and aims to meet the needs of farmers and consumers in industrialized
countries. It is essential that agricultural biotechnology research be relevant
to the needs of farmers in developing countries and to conditions in those
countries, and that the benefits of that research are transmitted to small-scale
farmers and consumers in those countries at affordable prices. Otherwise,
developing countries will not only fail to share in the benefits of agricultural
biotechnology, but will be seriously hurt as industrialized countries improve
their agricultural productivity.
The attitude toward risk among the non-poor in both industrialized and
developing countries is a constraint to the use of agricultural biotechnology in
and for developing countries. Among people whose children are not starving,
considerable resistance to agricultural biotechnology has arisen on the grounds
that it poses significant new ecological risks and that it has unacceptable social
and economic consequences. Although no ecological calamities have occurred,
some people fear that transgenic crops will develop troublesome new weeds or
threaten crop genetic diversity. Of course, any new products that pose such
risks should be carefully evaluated before they are released for commercial
development. But we should not forget that by raising productivity in food
production, agricultural biotechnology will reduce the need to cultivate new
lands and could therefore actually help conserve biodiversity and protect fragile
ecosystems. Developing countries should be encouraged to adopt regulations
that provide a reasonable measure of biosafety without crippling the transfer of
new products into the field.
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Public pressure in Western Europe is likely to move governments to
introduce legislation that will constrain or prohibit full use of the opportuni-
ties offered by genetic engineering and other tools of modern science for food
production and processing. There is a trend in several countries toward seeing
the application of science to agriculture as part of the problem rather than part
of the solution. Combined with this view is a failure to appreciate the need for
productivity increases in food production. While the application of modern
science, including genetic engineering and other biotechnology research, to
solving human health problems is applauded and encouraged, there is an
increasing suspicion that the application of such scientific methods to food
production and processing will compromise agricultural production systems,
food safety, and the health of current and future generations. In fact, modern
science methods, including molecular biology-based methods, offer
tremendous opportunities for expanding food production, reducing risks in
food production, improving environmental protection, and strengthening food
marketing in developing countries. Should legislation constraining modern
agricultural science spread within the developed countries, the consequences
for long-term food supplies in developing countries could be severe, partly
because of reduced exports by developed countries and partly because similar
policies might be adopted in developing countries as well.
As for the social and economic consequences of biotechnology, some are
concerned that large-scale and higher-income farmers will be favored because
they will have earlier access to and derive greater benefits from agricultural
biotechnology. These concerns are remarkably similar to those raised about
the Green Revolution. Whatever the shortcomings, real or alleged, of the
Green Revolution, it did avert widespread starvation and helped many
millions of people to escape hunger once and for all. With more pro-poor
institutions and policies, many more poor people could benefit. Similarly,
agricultural biotechnology can contribute to feeding many more people in a
sustainable way. The new technologies, through appropriate policies, can be
made accessible to small-scale farmers. Instead of rejecting the solutions
offered by science, we should change policies to assure that the solutions
benefit the poor.
The global community must keep its sights set on the goal of assuring food
security for all. Condemning biotechnology for its potential risks without
considering the alternative risks of prolonging the human misery caused by
hunger, malnutrition, and child death is unwise and unethical. In a world
where the consequence of inaction is death of thousands of children, we
cannot afford to be philosophical and elitist about any part of a possible
solution, including agricultural biotechnology. Modern science by itself will
not assure food for all, but without it the goal of food security for all cannot
be achieved.
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ENDNOTES
1. Thomas Malthus’ basic argument was that the world’s natural resources could
not assure expansions in food supply that would match population growth. Region
after region has disproved his prediction. While Malthus argued that the popu-
lation would grow geometrically and food production would grow arithmetically,
the extrapolation shown in Figure 14 are based on a nonlinear regression. Such
a function showed a better fit than linear functions for either of the two variables.
Extrapolations based on Malthus’s argument would result in a larger gap.
2. Their annual internal renewable water resources are less than 1,600 cubic meters
per person per year.
3. Approximated by water withdrawals because of a lack of consistent data on
consumptive use of water at national or regional levels.
